

**PHILOSOPHISCHES SEMINAR  
DER GEORG-AUGUST-UNIVERSITÄT GÖTTINGEN**

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**Im Rahmen des Kolloquiums der wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeiter des  
Philosophischen Seminars und des Oberseminars von Herrn Dr. Rami  
spricht am**

**Montag, den 11.12.2017**

**Julia Zakkou  
(FU Berlin)**

**zu dem Thema:**

***„The Cancellability Test for  
Conversational Implicatures“***

**Die Veranstaltung findet um 18 Uhr c.t. im Raum KWZ 0.606 statt.**

Hierzu ergeht herzliche Einladung.

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**Abstract**

Many people follow Grice in thinking that all conversational implicatures are cancellable. And often enough they use this insight as a test for conversational implicatures. If one wants to find out whether something is a conversational implicature, the test goes, one should ask oneself whether the thing in question is cancellable; if one finds that it is not cancellable, one can infer that it is not a conversational implicature; if one finds that it is cancellable, one can infer that it might well be a conversational implicature and conclude that one should now do further testing. Various philosophers and linguists have questioned the test though. Some have held that Grice's original claim is subject to counterexamples and that the test is therefore prone to failure. Others have argued that even though Grice's claim can be defended against the counterexamples, the test is not as useful as people have hoped. In this paper, I will defend Grice's test. I will not only argue that given the right view of cancellability all conversational implicatures are cancellable; I will also show that given this view the test can be usefully applied.